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1. Introduction 
Innovation and R&D activities have become crucial components in modern knowledge-
based economic systems (Romer, 1990). However, R&D is a risky process exhibiting high 
levels of uncertainty (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). Moreover, once knowledge is created by 
one company, other companies can never be fully prevented from free-riding on the R&D 
efforts of the company that did commit to the initial R&D investment (see Arrow, 1962). In 
addition to this imminent externality problem, also capital market constraints may hamper 
private R&D effort (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). As a result, the actual level of R&D 
spending will be lower than what would be socially desirable. Governments are well aware of 
this underinvestment problem and attempt to counter it by reducing the price of private R&D 
through granting public R&D funding to those projects which would normally not be 
undertaken. The aim of the government obviously is to increase the total R&D expenditure, 
which, in the ideal case, ultimately should result in more innovative output. However, it is 
possible that companies replace their own R&D budget with the money they received from 
the government. In that case, the total R&D expenditure would not increase and the 
instrument of public R&D funding would not be effective.  
As Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) prove, especially companies depending on external 
finance are burdened by asymmetric information and moral hazard motives and may 
experience serious obstacles in raising adequate R&D budgets (see also Hall, 2005). Hence, 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) may be less subject to these threats, as “The primary 
advantage of the multinational firm […] lies in the flexibility to transfer resources across 
borders through a globally maximizing network” (Kogut, 1993: 242). Markusen (1998) 
collects evidence showing that MNEs expand their foreign activities especially in R&D 
intensive industries, as knowledge-based assets can easily be transferred and serve many 
production facilities. Serapio and Dalton (1999) confirm the increasing involvement of MNEs 
in R&D efforts through foreign affiliates. Foreign-owned firms may also benefit from a better 
organizational structure, resulting in a larger control over knowledge flows. Therefore, 
uncertainty and externality risks may be kept to a minimum (see e.g. Veugelers and Cassiman, 
2004). Hence, the ownership structure of companies may result in heterogeneous effects of 
R&D subsidies and as a result, MNEs may be less likely to apply for a subsidy and on their 
turn, governments may be less inclined towards public R&D funding of MNEs. On the other 
hand, many scholars (see Bellak, 2004 for a survey) have shown that a significant   3
performance gap exists between foreign-owned and domestic firms, to the benefit of the 
former. As a consequence, foreign-owned companies, exhibiting larger technical efficiency, 
may just as well be more effective in their R&D activities (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2005). 
The government’s desire to maximize the expected rate of return of public R&D funding may 
therefore conversely justify why governments would also provide public R&D funding to 
MNEs.  
Being a small, open economy, Belgium hosts a large share of foreign-owned MNE 
activity. For example, in 2000, foreign affiliates employed more than 40% of the total 
workforce and created more than 50% of the total added value in the manufacturing industry 
(De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2005). Research on Flemish data (the largest region in Belgium) 
learns that these foreign-owned companies are less likely to receive a subsidy (see e.g. Aerts 
et al., 2007). But then again, they harvest the larger R&D grants and, aggregated, the lion’s 
share of the total subsidy amount in Flanders. Obviously, it is imperative for policy makers to 
know how this skewed state of affairs is translated in R&D efforts and innovative output of 
domestic and foreign-owned companies. This is exactly the research question that will be 
tackled in this paper: do R&D subsidies have a different impact on the R&D expenditure and 
the innovative output of domestic versus foreign-owned firms in Flanders? After this 
introduction, the relevant literature is presented. Next, the main methodological difficulties 
and adequate solution mechanisms are described. The fourth section elaborates on the data. 
The results are presented in the fifth section. The last section concludes with some final 
remarks and paths for further research. 
2.  Literature Review 
Two literature streams are relevant for this research. First, the literature on the 
evaluation of public R&D funding is reviewed. Second, we dive into the literature on the 
internationalization of R&D activities and more specifically, the different roles played by 
domestic and foreign-owned companies in host countries. 
2.1. Additionality of R&D subsidies 
The predominant inquiry in the evaluation of public R&D funding addresses the impact 
of subsidies on private R&D investment: does public money replace (or crowd out) private 
expenditure on R&D? After an extensive review of the literature, David and Hall (2000)   4
conclude that the results on potential crowding-out effects are ambiguous and they criticize 
that most existing studies neglect the problem of sample selection bias. R&D intensive firms 
may well be more likely to apply for a subsidy. Just as well, governments may be more 
inclined to grant them a subsidy. This makes R&D funding an endogenous variable, and 
should be tackled in an adequate way. Consequently, in more recent research the potential 
sample selection bias is taken into account through selection models, instrumental variable 
(IV) estimations (including simultaneous equation systems), difference-in-differences 
estimations and matching techniques. Although recent studies correct for a potential selection 
bias, the results remain ambiguous: many researchers reject full crowding-out effects, while 
others find indications that public R&D funding replaces private R&D investments to some 
extent (see Aerts et al., 2007, for a survey of methodologies and applications). Key reasons 
for these diverging conclusions are the use of different estimators, as well as their application 
on a broad range of countries, each with their own specific S&T policy. So far, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Flanders, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Spain, Sweden and 
the US have been subject to an R&D input evaluation analysis of their public R&D funding 
system
1.  
Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004) address the additionality issue using a cross-section of 
Flemish manufacturing and selected service companies with the nearest neighbour matching 
approach. Next, they extend their research in an IV framework, adding information on the 
amount of subsidies companies receive (Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2006). Both full and partial 
crowding-out effects are rejected. Aerts and Schmidt (2008) employ matching and the 
conditional difference-in-differences method with repeated cross-sections and find similar 
results. These studies jointly constitute substantial evidence supporting the positive effect of 
Flemish subsidies on private R&D spending. Conversely, Suetens (2002) applies an IV 
framework on a panel of Flemish firms, but her results are by and large not significant and 
full crowding-out cannot be rejected. A first explanation for these divergent results can be 
found in the use of a different methodology on a different dataset. Second, her variable of 
interest is, unlike in the research mentioned above (R&D expenditure), the number of R&D 
employees. David and Hall (2002) emphasize the importance of differentiating between the 
impact of subsidies on expenditure and employment, as companies may increase their R&D 
                                                           
1 Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004 and 2006), Aerts and Schmidt (2008), Ali-Yrkkö (2004), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Clausen (2007), 
Czarnitzki (2001), Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Duguet (2004), Ebersberger (2005), Fier (2002), González 
and Pazó (2006), González et al. (2005), Görg and Strobl (2007), Hussinger (2008), Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005), Lööf and Heshmati 
(2005) and Streicher et al. (2004) reject full crowding-out effects, while Busom (2000), Heijs and Herrera (2004), Kaiser (2004), Lach 
(2002), Suetens (2002), Toivanen and Niininen (2000) as well as Wallsten (2000) find indications that public R&D funding replaces private 
R&D investments to some extent. The interested reader is referred to Aerts et al. (2007) for a survey of the recent literature on the evaluation 
of public innovation policy.   5
spending, but not necessarily also their R&D staffing. Goolsbee (1998) for example, 
concluded that R&D subsidies are primarily translated into researcher wage increases. Using a 
matching approach, Aerts (2008) gives audience to the appeal of David and Hall (2002) to 
include labour market dynamics in additionality research and finds, in addition to significantly 
positive R&D expenditure increases, a smaller, but still positive impact on the number of 
R&D employees. This coincides with an increase of R&D wages, which tends to reflect an 
upskilling process. 
The work of Görg and Strobl (2007) is of particular relevance here. They employ the 
conditional difference-in-differences technique on a rich panel data set of Irish manufacturing 
plants. They allow for a certain degree of heterogeneous treatment effects, distinguishing 
between small, medium and large grants and add the dimension of foreign ownership, given 
the importance of foreign multinational companies in Ireland. In contrast to the Flemish 
innovation policy, the public R&D funding allocated to domestic Irish firms is almost five 
times larger than the support foreign-owned affiliates receive. They reject crowding-out of 
small and medium grants and find additionality effects of small grants. However, no effect 
can be confirmed in the sample of foreign-owned companies. They add that this result does 
not imply that public R&D grants to MNE affiliates are wasted, though, as they evaluate the 
effect on privately financed R&D and not on the total R&D investments. The R&D grants are 
actually deployed in Ireland, for R&D activities which may otherwise have been conducted in 
other locations. Moreover, knowledge spillovers to the benefit of the domestic economy may 
well occur. 
While investigating potential crowding-out effects of public R&D funding on private 
R&D expenditure indisputably is highly relevant for innovation policy evaluation, a rejection 
of such effects does not necessarily imply that increased R&D spending really induces 
technological progress and subsequently economic value creation. As hinted before, subsidies 
may just increase R&D wages instead of the real R&D effort. Or, subsidies can be used to 
finance duplicate R&D, which may induce inefficiency in the national innovation system 
(Irwin and Klenow, 1996). Moreover, an actual reinforcement of private R&D activities may 
be directed towards more risky and consequently potentially less successful projects (Setter 
and Tishler, 2005). Hence, extending additionality research on R&D inputs to an analysis of 
the induced innovative and economic output is imperative to get a full understanding of the 
impact of R&D subsidies. Klette et al. (2000) survey the literature on evaluation studies, also 
measuring firm growth, firm value, patents, etc. Since then, researchers also have been   6
evaluating measures on product and process innovations. More recent research extends the 
crowding-out question by linking privately financed and publicly induced R&D expenditure 
to innovative activity (Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004 as well as Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006). 
A two equation model is considered: first, a treatment effects analysis on R&D expenditure is 
conducted using the matching approach. In the second equation, a knowledge production 
function is estimated, relating a measure of innovative output to the firms’ R&D spending and 
other covariates. The first step allows disentangling total R&D spending into two 
components: on the one hand, that part of the R&D expenditure that would have been 
invested in the absence of subsidies, i.e. the estimated counterfactual situation. On the other 
hand, the remaining part of the R&D expenditure that has been induced by the receipt of 
subsidies, which comprises the amount of the subsidy itself, and the additionally stimulated 
privately financed R&D (the treatment effect). The two components add up to the total 
observed R&D spending, but the decomposition allows analyzing the productivity of privately 
financed versus the additionally induced R&D by public subsidies. 
The neo-classical paradigm of decreasing returns predicts that R&D projects, which 
would have been conducted anyway, exhibit higher returns; the marginal return of any 
additional R&D spending is smaller (Griliches, 1998). Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) 
indeed find that both components exert a significantly positive impact on the number of 
patents a company applies for, although the productivity of the public part is slightly lower. 
Patent counts do not give any indication of the social value of the publicly induced R&D, 
though. The return to these R&D budgets may well be higher than private benefits. Czarnitzki 
and Licht (2006) follow the same approach, distinguishing between East and West Germany 
to investigate whether and how the massive supply of public innovation funding fosters the 
transformation of East Germany from a planned to a market economy after the re-unification 
of Germany. For both regions, subsidies are shown to positively affect the average R&D 
spending as well as the number of patent applications. However, the R&D productivity in 
West Germany is significantly higher than in East Germany, which casts doubt on the 
efficiency of the German subsidy allocation. 
2.2. The internationalization of R&D activities  
Standard literature on MNEs and their affiliate R&D activity focuses on the motives for 
international R&D activities. Initially, MNE affiliates conducted R&D abroad to adapt the 
MNE’s products to local markets: the knowledge of the MNE is exploited to serve foreign   7
markets: the so-called asset-exploiting (Dunning and Narula, 1995) or home-base-exploiting 
(Kuemmerle, 1997) motive. Over time however, R&D activities became more and more 
internationalized and foreign MNE affiliates became a potential source of valuable knowledge 
to the MNE head quarters. External knowledge is picked up and internalized in the MNE: the 
so-called asset-seeking (Dunning and Narula, 1995) or home-base-augmenting (Kuemmerle, 
1997) motive. The increasing importance of the home-base-augmenting motive in 
internationalization activities of MNEs excited a growing fear of national governments that 
foreign affiliate R&D activity may become a knowledge drain and hollow out the host 
country’s innovative capability (Meyer-Krahmer and Reger, 1999 as well as Guellec and 
Zuniga, 2006). Conversely, domestic companies may also just as well benefit from the 
knowledge which is encased in these foreign-owned companies. An often mentioned 
prerequisite to realize positive spillover effects is a substantial level of absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levin, 1989 and Haskel et al., 2007). Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) investigate 
how foreign subsidiaries can channel international technology diffusion in Belgium. They 
find that unwanted spillovers are minimized by limiting the personnel turnover and cannot 
confirm the presence of positive spillovers to domestic companies. However, they also show 
that the host country gains significantly when foreign-owned technology sourcing affiliates 
closely cooperate with domestic firms. Ivarsson (2002) draws a similar conclusion from his 
research on Swedish companies and suggests efforts should be made to strengthen 
technological linkages. Nevertheless, even when the MNE knowledge does not spill over to 
domestic firms, foreign-owned affiliates may still create economic value for the host 
country’s society. Bellak (2004) gives an extensive overview on research unravelling 
performance gaps between foreign-owned versus domestic firms, showing up in wages, skills, 
labour, productivity, growth, profitability and technology (see also Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 
2000). He concludes that MNE affiliates outperform domestic companies, most often because 
of their ownership status and not because of the fact that they are foreign-owned; the gaps 
between domestic and foreign MNEs are significantly smaller than the gaps between uni-
national and multinational firms. However, foreign ownership may still be a reason to explain 
a performance gap as foreign-owned firms face the liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1976 and 
Zaheer, 1995). Because foreign-owned firms initially are not familiar with the host country’s 
context, they are disadvantaged, relative to domestic firms. Firm-specific advantages enable 
multinationals to overcome this initial discriminatory position (Caves, 1971). As a result, 
multinationals may excel after they have learned to adapt to the host country and 
consequently outperform the domestic companies.    8
Especially the potential difference in innovative effort and R&D efficiency between 
domestic and foreign-owned firms is interesting in the evaluation of additionality effects, as 
governments may cherry-pick exactly these high performing foreign-owned companies in 
their subsidy allocation decision to maximize the expected rate of return. Many researchers 
confirm the presence of a gap in innovative capabilities between foreign-owned and domestic 
companies. Country studies in favour of the higher innovative capabilities of foreign-owned 
firms cover Belgium (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2005), Finland (Ebersberger et al., 2005), 
Norway (Ebersberger and Lööf, 2005), Sweden (Ebersberger and Lööf, 2004), and the UK 
(Frenz and Ietto-Gillies, 2007). Falk and Falk (2006) conduct propensity score matching to 
relate innovation intensity, computed as expenditures on innovation divided by sales, to 
foreign ownership in Austria and conclude that foreign affiliates spend relatively less on 
innovative activities. They do not evaluate potential differences at the output side of the 
innovative process, though. Ebersberger et al. (2007) analyze the impact of foreign ownership 
on innovativeness in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. They found no 
differences in input, but higher levels of output in foreign-owned firms, again suggesting that 
foreign-owned firms conduct their R&D activities in a more efficient way. Explanations for 
the better performance of foreign-owned companies can be found in firm-specific assets of the 
MNE. Also, MNEs can capitalize scale advantages, possess a larger knowledge base, which is 
easily accessible for affiliates, and reduce duplicate research, because R&D activities can be 
shared and coordinated internally. Moreover, different ownership structures may be related to 
differences in innovative strategies, potentially resulting in higher efficiency. De Bondt et al. 
(1988) found that Belgian domestic firms focus on specific market segments, whereas MNE 
affiliates rather conduct more R&D efforts for larger markets. When foreign-owned 
companies can realize a higher efficiency in their innovative productivity and the innovative 
and economic value can subsequently be captured by the host country, the social value of 
public R&D funding of MNE affiliates may be very high. Positive impacts may arise on the 
host country’s innovativeness (measured in patents, sales of new products,…) and create 
economic value (measured in net added value growth, employment,…). This would then 
justify why governments may allocate more public R&D funding to foreign-owned 
companies.    9
3. Methodology  
An extensive range of econometric methods is available to correct for the selection bias 
in additionality research (see Aerts et al., 2007, for a comprehensive overview). In the 
following subsections this endogeneity problem and the correction method employed here, i.e. 
the matching estimator, are explained. In a last subsection I briefly summarize how the 
counterfactual, i.e. privately financed, and the publicly induced R&D expenditure are 
disentangled in order to measure their respective impact on the technological progress and 
economic value in the host country. 
3.1. Selection bias 
I empirically evaluate the impact of public R&D funding. The average impact of a 
subsidy can be computed as follows:  
) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − = = S Y E S Y E
C T
TT α , (1) 
where Y is the outcome variable (e.g. R&D expenditure) of a firm
2, in the so-called treated 
(T) and counterfactual (C) situation, S is the treatment status (S=1: treated; S=0: untreated – 
treatment is the receipt of a subsidy here). So  TT α , the average impact of the treatment on the 
treated firms, results from comparing the actual outcome of subsidized firms with their 
potential outcome in case of not receiving a grant. The approach of measuring potential 
outcomes goes back to Roy (1951). The actual outcome  ) 1 ( = S Y E
T  can be estimated by the 
sample mean of the outcome in the group of subsidized firms.  
The counterfactual situation  ) 1 ( = S Y E
C  can however never be observed and has to be 
estimated. In a hastily analysis a researcher could compare the average R&D spending of 
subsidized and non-subsidized companies to compute the treatment effect on the treated, 
assuming that:  
) 0 ( ) 1 ( = = = S Y E S Y E
C C . (2) 
However, subsidized companies may well have been more R&D active than the non-
subsidized companies, even without the subsidy program. This would imply a selection bias 
in the estimation of the treatment effect. Ex ante innovative and R&D intensive firms may be 
                                                           
2 For the sake of readability we omit these firm indices in the equations.   10
more likely to receive an R&D subsidy, as governments want to maximize the expected rate 
of return of their public money and therefore may well cherry-pick proposals of companies 
with considerable R&D expertise. Moreover, it is quite possible that those R&D intensive 
firms have an information advantage and are better acquainted with policy measures they 
qualify for. As a result they would be more likely to apply for a subsidy. Expression (32) only 
holds in an experimental setting where there would be no selection bias and subsidies are 
granted randomly to firms. This is most likely not to be the case in current innovation 
policies.  
As the highest expected success is correlated with current R&D spending, the subsidy 
receipt (treatment) becomes an endogenous variable. To estimate treatment effects while 
taking this potential endogeneity problem into account, econometric literature has developed a 
range of methods (see e.g. the surveys of Heckman et al., 1999; Blundell and Costa Dias, 
2000, 2002 as well as Aerts et al., 2007, for a survey of methods applied in additionality 
research). Examples of these methods are selection models, instrumental variable (IV) 
estimations (including simultaneous equation systems), difference-in-differences estimations 
and matching. The latter method will be employed here.  
3.2. Matching estimator 
The matching estimator is a non-parametric method and its main advantage is that no 
particular functional form of equations has to be specified. The disadvantages are strong 
assumptions and heavy data requirements. The main purpose of the matching estimator is to 
re-establish the conditions of an experiment. The matching estimator attempts to construct an 
accurate counterpart sample for the treated firms' outcomes if they would not have been 
treated, by pairing each treated firm with members of a comparison group. Under the 
matching assumption, the only remaining difference between the two groups is the actual 
subsidy receipt. The difference in outcome variables can then be attributed to the subsidy. 
Rubin (1977) proved that the receipt of subsidies and the potential outcome are 
independent for firms with the same set of exogenous characteristics X=x: 
x X S Y Y
C T = ⊥ , . (3) 
This crucial conditional independence assumption (CIA) helps to overcome the problem 
that the counterfactual outcome  ) 1 ( = S Y E
C  is unobservable. If the CIA holds, the expected   11
outcome  ) , 0 ( x X S Y E
C = =  can be used as a measure of the potential outcome of the subsidy 
recipients. However, the CIA is only fulfilled if all variables X influencing the outcome Y and 
selection status S are known and available in the dataset. This imposes heavy requirements on 
the richness of the dataset. If the relevant variables are known and available and the CIA 
holds, the equation  
( ) ( ) x X S Y E x X S Y E
C C = = = = = , 0 , 1  (4) 
is valid and the average outcome of subsidized firms in the absence of a subsidy can be 
calculated from a sample of comparable, i.e. matched, firms.  
Another feature the matching procedure relies on, is the compliance with the Stable 
Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which requires that the potential outcome for 
each treated firm is stable: it should take one single value (and not follow a distribution) and 
the treatment of one firm should not affect the treatment effect on another firm (Rubin, 1990). 
Unfortunately this cannot be tested. 
In the matching process, for all treated firms a valid counterpart should be found in the 
non-treated population and every firm should represent a potential subsidy recipient. 
Therefore, a so-called common support restriction is imposed. If the samples of treated and 
non-treated firms would have no or only little overlap in the exogenous characteristics X, 
matching is not applicable to obtain consistent estimates. If the assumptions hold, the average 
treatment effect on the treated would consequently amount to 
( ) ( ) x X S Y E x X S Y E
C T M
TT = = − = = = , 0 , 1 α  (5) 
which can be estimated using the sample means of both groups.  
In the ideal case, the matching procedure includes as many matching arguments X as 
possible to find a perfect twin in the control group of non-treated firms for each treated firm. 
However, the more dimensions that are included, the more difficult it becomes to find a good 
match: the so-called curse of dimensionality enters. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed 
that it is valid to reduce the number of matching dimensions X to a single index: the 
propensity score ) ( ˆ X P , which is the probability to receive a subsidy. Lechner (1998) 
suggested hybrid matching, where the propensity score  ) ( ˆ X P and a subset of X condition the 
matching procedure. This increases the accurateness of the matching procedure, since the 
equivalence of these extra variables is explicitly imposed, in addition to their weight in the   12
propensity score. Each treated firm is then matched to its nearest neighbour by minimizing the 
Mahalanobis distance between the respective propensity scores and additional matching 
arguments. To obtain the best possible match, a large pool of controls is required. Therefore, I 
match with replacement and allow different treated firms to be matched to the same non-
treated firm. This will cause a bias in the ordinary t-statistic on mean differences, which has to 
be corrected (Lechner, 2001).  
3.3. R&D output evaluation 
Once the additionality effect is estimated, it is disentangled into two components: the 
privately financed, counterfactual, R&D expenditure (RDC) on the one hand and the 
additional, publicly induced, R&D expenditure (RDdif) on the other hand, following 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) as well as Czarnitzki and Licht (2006). Obviously, the 
additional R&D expenditure of companies which did not receive any funding is zero, and 
their counterfactual R&D spending equals their actual R&D expenditure. In summary, 
companies’ R&D expenditure is disentangled as displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Decomposition of R&D expenditure 
----------------------------RDC---------------------------- --------------------------RDdif-------------------------- 




T S Y α − =1   ( ) 0 = S Y
C   M
TT α   0 
Next, different kinds of ‘productivity functions’ are estimated to relate R&D input to 
output within the additionality framework. The decomposition allows disentangling 
heterogeneous effects on the productivity of the counterfactual versus leveraged R&D 
spending. Innovative activity is measured in terms of the share of new products in the total 
sales as well as the engagement in a patent application. In addition to the productivity of 
companies’ innovative efforts, also economic value creation more in general is measured, in 
terms of the growth of the net added value. Censored-normal as well as ordinary regression 
models are employed for the share of new products in the total sales and the growth of the net 
added value. A probit model is used to estimate potential productivity differences in the 
patenting activity.  
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4. The data  
The particularities of public R&D funding and foreign multinational activity in Flanders 
are briefly explained first. Next, I come to the description of the data and the variables used to 
conduct an assessment of R&D subsidies in Flanders. 
4.1. Contextual framework 
In Flanders, IWT, the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation through Science and 
Technology in Flanders, is the single counter where companies can apply for a subsidy. This 
implies that subsidies, at the Flemish and Belgian level, as well as certain EU-funded 
projects
3 are evaluated and granted through IWT. Accelerated depreciation for R&D capital 
assets and R&D tax allowances are available through the federal Belgian government. In 
contrast to most countries, the Belgian R&D tax allowances are fixed and not granted as a 
percentage: for each additional employee employed in scientific research, the company is 
granted a tax exemption for a fixed amount, in the year of recruitment. However, as Van 
Pottelsberghe et al. (2003) indicate, very few Belgian companies actually make use of these 
fiscal measures
4. Main reasons are a low level of acquaintance with the system, complexity 
and high administration costs
5 and the fact that the measures are not significantly substantial
6. 
Direct R&D funding through IWT remains the largest source of public R&D grants in the 
private sector in Flanders
7. 
De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2005) confirm Belgium’s weak FDI outward position 
relative to its FDI inward position: there is a strong presence of foreign multinational activity 
in Flanders. In 2001, 2,958 foreign affiliates employed 293,409 people and created an added 
value of about 25 billion EUR (Sleuwaegen et al., 2004a). These affiliates usually are owned 
in a structure of a foreign majority share holder; head quarters are mostly located in the 
Netherlands (34%), France (19%), the US (10%) or Germany (8%) (Vanweddingen, 2006). In 
terms of the number of companies, this foreign presence is strongest in the service sector 
                                                           
3 The Framework Program projects are not managed through IWT. However, typically the scale of these projects is very large because these 
projects are often managed in international company consortia. As a result, the number of Flemish firms engaging in these programs is very 
limited. 
4 Due to recent changes in the Science and Technology Policy, this situation has changed, though. In the current system, fiscal measures, and 
more specifically tax credits for R&D personnel, are becoming increasingly popular. However, this is not relevant in the current paper, as our 
data was collected before the change. 
5 First, each year the company has to deliver a certificate. Second, the researcher should be full time employed in the research department of 
the same company to qualify. Third, the tax allowance is nominative, inducing a burden to keep track of all employees who benefited from 
the measure in the past. 
6 First, the amount of the exemption is not sufficiently significant. Second, the definition of highly qualified personnel is too strict, so that 
only very few employees qualify for the measure. Third, the tax exemption is a short term measure (it only relates to the first year of 
recruitment) while R&D typically is a long term process. 
7 The interested reader is referred to Aerts and Czarnitzki (2006) for a detailed overview of the public R&D funding system in Flanders.   14
(75% of the foreign affiliates), and more specifically in wholesale trade and other business 
services. However, a limited number of foreign-owned companies realizes a considerable 
share of the added value and employment in industry (especially in chemicals, automotive and 
metals): they represent 8% in the total number of foreign companies, but 60% and 51% in 
terms of the added value and employment, respectively, created by all foreign affiliates. 
(Sleuwaegen et al., 2004a) 
A comparison of the presence of foreign-owned versus domestic companies 
(Sleuwaegen et al., 2004b) learns that foreign affiliates are especially active in the high-tech 
and medium-high-tech sectors, while in comparison, Flemish firms are rather active in the 
medium-low-tech sectors. Performance indicators show that foreign-owned companies 
outperform domestic companies in terms of profitability and added value per employee 
(Sleuwaegen et al., 2004b) as well as innovative capabilities (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 
2005). 
Although Flanders is moving towards a knowledge economy, it is strongly dependent 
on multinational activity in this respect. In the chemical, automotive and metal industries as 
well as in the telecommunication sector, there is a strong sensitivity to delocalisation: the 
presence of foreign affiliates is considerable and delocalisation would imply serious decreases 
in the number of companies, employment and added value in these sectors in Flanders. In a 
dynamic analysis, Sleuwaegen et al. (2004b) look at the evolution of the number of jobs and 
added value between 1998 and 2002. They found that the number of jobs in foreign 
enterprises went down in the low-tech, medium-high-tech and medium-low-tech sectors; the 
number of jobs in the high-tech sectors increased in foreign affiliates because of new entrants. 
In the Flemish companies, employment in low-tech industries decreased (especially in 
textiles), but increased in medium-high and medium-low-tech industries. In this way, Flanders 
may start reducing its strong dependence on multinational activity. 
With respect to R&D activity, it can be observed that in the foreign activity in the high-
tech and medium-tech industries, especially Germany and the US are highly active 
(Sleuwaegen, 2004b). Also, these countries exhibit a high R&D-intensity: in 2006 the share of 
the GERD in the GDP was 2.51% in Germany and 2.62% in the US, compared to 1.85% in 
Belgium (OECD, 2007). So, next to the economic gains from multinational activity in terms 
of employment and added value, foreign multinationals can be an extremely valuable source 
of knowledge, in support of the local R&D activity. A primordial condition however, is the 
ability of the domestic companies to absorb and internalise this knowledge. Hence, the   15
Belgian and Flemish government seem to follow a double strategy: on the one hand, it is 
important that the Flemish economy develops into a strong and healthy knowledge-intensive 
economy, reducing its dependence on foreign activity, while on the other hand, the 
government wants to promote Flanders as the ideal location for setting-up and expanding 
multinational activity. 
The Belgian government stresses its non-discriminatory treatment: “foreign companies, 
subsidiaries or branches, have the same legal obligations, but can also apply to all possible 
incentives, as domestic companies” (FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie, 2008). 
With different incentives, a considerable attempt was made to create a business-friendly 
environment. Besides their explicit claim of non-discrimination, the Flemish and Belgian 
government make substantial efforts to attract business activity from abroad, especially by 
providing clear information about different options and possibilities and thereby facilitating 
access to the Belgian and Flemish economic and technological potential.  
The regions carry the full responsibility in granting direct financial incentives. Most of 
the tax incentives are provided through the federal government, but some aspects are left to 
the decision power of the regions. Employment and training incentives are provided at both 
the federal and regional level. The Belgian Science and Technology Policy is highly 
regionalized and the Flemish government has a large degree of control in this matter. Other 
policy areas are less regionalized. As multinational activity in high-tech industries is expected 
to generate high gains in terms of employment, added value, performance and innovative 
capacity, with large potential spillovers towards the local economy, foreign affiliates 
constitute an important player in the Flemish economy. The Flemish government has a strong 
power, especially in granting financial incentives for R&D activity and the provision of R&D 
subsidies may serve as an instrument to attract foreign activity in Flanders. So, especially 
here, this consideration becomes very relevant: through public R&D funding, the Flemish 
government may aspire to increase R&D activity, but also attract multinational (R&D) 
activity more in general. On the other hand, the total amount of public R&D funding which 
companies can receive is limited to 8 million EUR per year. In larger companies this amount 
typically represents only 5% to 10% of their total R&D expenditure. Hence, R&D grants are 
often regarded as ‘structural support’. The Flemish government puts high value on the 
valorisation of the research results in Flanders. This is hard to enforce, though, especially in 
multinational companies. In this paper, the impact of public R&D funding is looked into, in   16
domestic versus foreign-owned companies and at both the input as well as output side of the 
R&D process. 
4.2. Variables 
The potential crowding-out effect of R&D subsidies in Flanders is addressed 
empirically with data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The CIS is conducted 
biannually and covers most EU countries. The questionnaire is by and large harmonized. 
Eurostat (2004) presents detailed descriptive survey results for all countries, as well as 
aggregate statistics. To evaluate the impact of subsidies at the input side, the CIS III (1998-
2000) and IV (2002-2004) waves are pooled. To measure the impact of the subsidies at the 
output side, CIS IV (2002-2004) and V (2004-2006) data are used. The innovation data are 
supplemented with patent application data from the European Patent Office since 1978. 
Balance sheet data from the National Bank of Belgium (Belfirst) were merged to the dataset 
to provide additional ownership information and financial indicators. Last, information on the 
subsidy history of each company was added: IWT keeps track of all subsidy applications and 
potential subsequent grants. 
The receipt of subsidies is denoted by a dummy variable (FUN) indicating whether the 
firm, observed in the CIS IV (III)
8, received public R&D funding in the period 2002 to 2004 
(1998 to 2000). On average 22% of the Flemish companies received public funding in the 
observation period. The Flemish government provided 68% of these firms with R&D funds; 
the national and European governments were to a lesser, but nevertheless significant extent, 
sources of public R&D funding of Flemish companies (40% and 19% respectively). The 
funding impact is measured as an average effect over the different funding schemes.  
The independent variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating foreign ownership 
(FOREIGN). First, the CIS information on foreign ownership was extracted. Next, I 
compared this information with ownership information from the balance sheet data of the 
National Bank of Belgium. This allowed me to fill up some missing data. As common in the 
literature, foreign ownership was defined as being owned for at least 10% by a foreign mother 
company
9. In my sample, 26% of the companies is owned by a foreign mother company. The 
                                                           
8 In the description of the variables, I always refer to two years, i.e. the observation window of the CIS-waves.  
9 The low cut-off value of 10% is more rigid to some extent, though. More detailed information on the degree of ownership is included in the 
CIS IV and CIS V waves. The descriptive statistics show that 95% of the Flemish subsidiaries observed in the CIS are being owned by 50% 
or more by their parent company. Therefore, the control power of the parent companies is substantial in the sample.   17
most important countries where head offices of Belgian subsidiaries in this sample are 
located, are the Netherlands, the US, Germany, France and Great Britain. 
The outcome variables are twofold. First, R&D expenditure
10 (in million EUR) at the 
firm level in 2004(2000), RD, is evaluated. However, as the distribution of this indicator is 
highly skewed in the economy, the R&D intensity, RDint (R&D expenditure / turnover * 
100), is evaluated as well. Also due to the skewness of RD and RDint, some extreme values 
might affect the mean of the distribution significantly, so that a few observations may 
determine the estimation results. A logarithmic transformation scales down the large values 
and reduces the problem with these skewed distributions. Therefore, the logs
11 of RD and 
RDint are additionally evaluated as outcome variables. All outcome variables refer to the year 
2004(2000). 
Several control variables are introduced which may affect both the probability to 
receive R&D subsidies and R&D effort, respectively. As the subsidy dummy covers a three 
year period, I use, whenever possible, values of the covariates measured at the beginning of 
the reference period, 2002(1998) in order to avoid endogeneity problems in the selection 
equation. Including the number of employees allows controlling for size effects, which are 
empirically often found to explain innovativeness (see e.g. Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). 
Moreover, the Flemish S&T policy puts high value on R&D activities performed by small and 
medium sized companies. Therefore, the size variable is also expected to influence the 
subsidy receipt. Again, the logarithmic transformation (lnEMP) is used to avoid any potential 
estimation bias caused by skewness of the data. 
PROJ is a count variable, reflecting the total number of project proposals each company 
submitted in order to obtain an R&D subsidy in the preceding five years. It is obtained by 
merging the firm level CIS/patent information with the project level ICAROS database, in 
which IWT keeps track of all subsidy applications by Flemish companies. PROJ is an 
important control variable since it is very likely highly correlated with both the probability to 
receive a subsidy and the R&D activities. Companies which submitted many projects in the 
past may on the one hand be more innovative and therefore more likely to apply for a subsidy 
to support their extensive R&D activities. On the other hand, they are more experienced in 
applying for a subsidy and hence possibly more ‘eligible’ for a grant. 
                                                           
10 In the CIS survey, R&D expenditure is defined in accordance with the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002).  
11 Zero values of RD and RDint were replaced by the minimum observed value to compute the logs.   18
Another important variable is the firms' patent stock. As I use data from two cross-
sectional datasets which do not include time-series information, the patent stock enables 
controlling for previous (successful) R&D activities. Obviously, not all innovation efforts lead 
to patents, which Griliches (1990: 1669) formulated nicely as “not all inventions are 
patentable, not all inventions are patented”. Likewise, not all patented innovations result from 
R&D activities; the R&D process is only part of a company’s innovative activity
12. Moreover, 
the propensity to patent may be heterogeneous among firms. However, as data on previous 
R&D expenditure are not available, the patent stock is the best approximation of past 
innovative activities. I use all patent information in the EPO database and generate the stock 
of patents for each firm as the depreciated sum of all patents filed at the EPO from 1978 until 
2001(1997):  
t t t PATA PAT PAT + − = −1 ) 1 ( δ ,   (6) 
where PAT is the patent stock of a firm in period t and t-1, respectively, PATA are the 
number of patent applications filed at the EPO and δ is a constant depreciation rate of 
knowledge which is set to 0.15 as common in the literature (see e.g. Jaffe, 1986; Griliches and 
Mairesse, 1984). On the one hand, firms that exhibit previous successful innovation projects 
indicated by patents, are more likely to receive public R&D funding, because public 
authorities may follow the ‘picking-the-winner’ principle in order to minimize the expected 
failure rate of the innovation projects, and hence, to maximize the expected benefit for the 
society. On the other hand, the patent stock controls for the past average innovative 
engagement of the firms, because it is expected that firms that were highly innovative in the 
past will continue this strategy. The patents are counted only until 2001(1997), to ensure that 
the stock definitely refers to past innovation activities and to avoid a simultaneous equation 
bias in the regression analysis. The patent stock enters into the regression as patent stock per 
employee (PAT/EMP) to reduce potential multicollinearity with firm size. 
The export quota (EXQU = exports / turnover) measures the degree of international 
competition a firm faces. Firms that engage in foreign markets may be more innovative than 
others and, hence, would be more likely to apply for subsidies.  
Next, variables reflecting the technological and financial quality of the company may 
play a significant role in both the subsidy and R&D story. These characteristics are proxied by 
capital intensity (CAPint) as the value of fixed assets per employee and cash-flow (CASHF) 
                                                           
12 Innovative activity is defined as “all those scientific, technological, organizational, financial and commercial steps which actually, or are 
intended to, lead to the implementation of technologically new or improved products or processes” (OECD/Eurostat, 1997: 10).   19
(both in million EUR) respectively. Both variables are obtained from balance sheet records 
provided by the National Bank of Belgium (through the Belfirst database). CASHF is also 
divided by the number of employees (CASHF/EMP) to avoid multicollinearity with firm size.  
The variable SCOM acts as a measure of absorptive capacity, signalling to which extent 
information from competitors in the same industry is absorbed by the company. To avoid 
potential endogeneity with the outcome variables, this variable was rescaled on the three digit 
industry level. A dummy variable indicating whether a firm belongs to a group (GROUP) 
controls for different governance structures
13. Firms belonging to a group may be more likely 
to receive subsidies because they presumably have better access to information about 
governmental actions due to their network linkages.  
Twelve industry dummies (BR) are included to allow for differences between sectors. 
On the one hand, some sectors may exhibit a larger R&D intensity. On the other hand, 
governments may favour certain sectors in their R&D policy, which increases the likelihood 
of receiving subsidies for firms in these industries. The relationship between size and R&D 
activities is often found to depend on industry characteristics. Acs and Audretsch (1987), 
amongst others, conclude that large firms are more innovative when they operate in capital-
intensive and highly concentrated sectors, while smaller firms expose a higher degree of 
innovative activity in industries which are highly innovative and dependent on skilled labour. 
Moreover, some funding schemes directly target specific industries or groups of industries, 
like Biotech programs. Therefore, interaction terms between the industry dummies and 
lnEMP (BR_lnEMP) are included as well. As I use data from two pooled cross-sections and 
the average R&D expenditure was subjected to a downward trend (see e.g. Debackere and 
Veugelers, 2007), a year dummy (YEAR=1 for the CIS IV wave) was included in the 
regressions to control for differences over time. Moreover, the monetary variables (RD, lnRD, 
CAPint and CASHF) were deflated (EconStats, 2007). The total sample consists of 1441 
observations, of which 313 companies received public R&D funding and of which 372 
companies are owned by a foreign mother company. The summary statistics of the variables 
are presented in Appendix 1 (on page 40). 
In the second step, the counterfactual and additionally leveraged R&D spending are 
disentangled, to evaluate the impact of Flemish R&D subsidies at the output side of the 
innovative process and, more general, their economic impact. Obviously, developing 
successful innovative output is time-consuming. Therefore, lead variables are extracted from 
                                                           
13 Obviously, this control variable only matters for domestic firms: foreign-owned firms by definition belong to a group.   20
two other data sources. The subsequent CIS wave, i.e. the CIS V, conducted in 2006, provides 
information on the share in the total 2005 turnover realized by products which are new to the 
market (TURNMAR = share * turnover). As a robustness check, also the impact on 
TURNMAR per employee (TURNMAR/EMP) is tested. Second, the CIS V asks whether the 
company applied for a patent in the period 2004-2006. This information was translated into 
the dummy variable PATdum
14. However, the variables TURNMAR, TURNMAR/EMP and 
PATdum are only available as a lead variable for companies which are also observed in the 
CIS IV survey. Unfortunately, this results in a limited number of observations, as we loose the 
CIS III wave. To estimate a more general economic impact of R&D subsidies, the net added 
value (the value of the output produced minus the costs of the intermediate goods) was 
computed from the Belfirst database. The variable NAV_growth measures the growth of the 
deflated net added value of a company between 2005 and 2004 (2001 and 2000, respectively) 
and is linked to the firms observed in the CIS IV and III, respectively. An extra control 
variable, the one-year-lagged deflated net added value (NAVt-1) was introduced to control for 
past productivity. To avoid multicollinearity with size, this variable was normalized by the 
number of employees (NAV/EMP t-1). The summary statistics of these variables can be found 
in Table 2. 
Table 2: Summary statistics – output additionality 
Variable  # obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
TURNMAR  151  0.341  1.004 0 7.315 
TURNMAR/EMP 151  2.277  3.917  0  23.878 
PATdum 360  0.153  0.360  0  1 
NAV_growth 1455  0.061  3.523  -32.927  61.845 
NAV/EMP t-1  1455  0.063 0.049 -0.848 0.702 
5. Estimates 
In this section, the estimation results are presented. First, I focus on the input side of the 
R&D process and measure potential additionality effects in terms of R&D expenditure and 
R&D intensity. In a second step, the impact on R&D spending due to public funding is first 
related to the output side of the R&D process, in terms of the share of new products in the 
turnover and the patenting propensity and second, to a more general economic indicator, i.e. 
the growth of the net added value realized by a company. 
                                                           
14 By using patent information from the CIS survey, I avoid the truncation problem which would occur if the EPO patent information would 
have been used. However, in doing so, I can only assess a dummy variable and refrain from using information on the number of patent 
applications.   21
As indicated in the methodological section, hybrid nearest neighbour matching with 
replacement is employed. To elucidate the role of foreign ownership in the additionality issue, 
the same matching procedure is conducted for three samples. First, the full dataset is used. 
Second, the full sample is split according to ownership and potential additionality effects are 
evaluated for foreign-owned versus domestic firms in two separate estimations. The 
propensity score ) (X P
15, lnEMP and YEAR
16 are used to select matched pairs with:  
P(X) = f(FOREIGN, lnEMP, PROJ, PAT/EMP, EXQU, CAPint, CASHF/EMP, SCOM, 
GROUP, YEAR, BR, BR_lnEMP).  (7) 
Full sample 
The summary statistics in Appendix 1 (on page 40) show that funded and non-funded 
companies seem to exhibit different characteristics for both the outcome and control variables. 
This is confirmed by two-sided t-tests (not reported here). Hence, the difference in outcome 
variables cannot be assigned as such to the receipt of a subsidy: a selection bias may be 
present here. Matching can solve this problem. First, the propensity to receive funding is 
estimated (see Table 3). As already indicated before, foreign-owned companies are 
significantly disadvantaged to receive a subsidy. This bias may be due to the applying 
(company) as well as the granting (government) side of the subsidy system. On the other 
hand, these foreign-owned firms receive a disproportionate amount of subsidies, potentially 
resulting in heterogeneous additionality effects, as hypothetically stated in this paper. 
Furthermore, size, experience in project applications, past innovative activity and 
international competition are important determinants increasing the likelihood of receiving an 
R&D subsidy. Industry affiliation matters as well. As the interaction terms BR_lnEMP are 






                                                           
15 Obviously FOREIGN is only included in the full sample; GROUP is only included when domestic firms are in the sample. 
16 YEAR is included to guarantee that companies are matched only to other companies observed in the same CIS wave. This overcomes the 
potential bias due to changes over time of the covariates and/or the outcome variables.   22
Table 3: Propensity to receive funding – full sample 
  Probit estimates    Marginal effects 
  Coef.  Std. Err.    dy/dx  Std. Err. 
FOREIGN°  -0.4530  ***  0.1156  -0.1123  ***  0.0254 
lnEMP  0.0994 ***  0.0372    0.0273 ***  0.0102 
PROJ  0.5459 ***  0.0634    0.1497 ***  0.0188 
PAT/EMP  0.1018 ***  0.0268    0.0279 ***  0.0074 
EXQU 0.7320  ***  0.1348   0.2007  ***  0.0364 
CAPint  0.0670   0.3383    0.0184   0.0928 
CASHF/EMP  0.7975   0.5694    0.2187   0.1565 
SCOM  0.1515   0.0934    0.0415   0.0256 
GROUP°  0.1208   0.1024    0.0330   0.0278 
YEAR°  -0.1977  **  0.0857  -0.0542  **  0.0234 
constant -1.6875  ***  0.2109         
BR  χ²(11) = 20.97  
p = 0.0337 
Log-Likelihood -607 
Pseudo R²  0.1951 
# obs.  1441 
° dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). 
Standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
 
The predicted propensity to receive a subsidy (the propensity score), is combined with 
lnEMP and YEAR to select pairs of subsidized and very similar non-subsidized companies. 
T-tests on the matched samples (not reported here) do no longer exhibit significant differences 
in the control variables foreign ownership, size, past project applications, patent stock, export 
ratio, capital intensity, cash flow, absorptive capacity, group membership, industry affiliation 
and the probability to receive funding. However, the differences in the outcome variables 
remain significant (see Table 4): the funded companies are more R&D active; they spend 
more on R&D both in absolute terms (0.636 million EUR, or 58%) and in proportion to the 
turnover (2.73%, or 52%). The crowding-out hypothesis is rejected: the average R&D 
expenditure and the average R&D intensity have increased due to the public funding of R&D. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics after matching – full sample 
  Subsidized companies  Selected control group 
  Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err. 
----------------- α ° ----------------- 
RD 1.0962  0.1695  0.4598  0.0711  0.6364  ***  58% 
RDint 5.2155 0.5427  2.4869  0.3158 2.7286  ***  52% 
lnRD -2.4131  0.1932 -4.5537 0.2405 2.1406  ***   
lnRDint -0.4997  0.1874  -2.5835  0.2325  2.0838  ***   
# obs.  297  297       
Note: the control variables (FOREIGN, lnEMP, PROJ, PAT/EMP, EXQU, CAPint, CASHF/EMP, GROUP, SCOM, 
YEAR, BR and BR_lnEMP) as well as the propensity scores are not significantly different after the matching and 
therefore not reported here. 16 funded companies were deleted due to common support restrictions. 
° *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) of the t-tests on mean equality between the sample of funded 
firms and the selected control group. α is the average treatment effect of a subsidy on the funded firms. The relative 
difference is calculated as 




= = , 1
α
.These statistics are based on Lechner’s (2001) asymptotic approximation 
of the standard errors that accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. 
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The next step now is to split the full sample according to ownership in foreign-owned 
and domestic companies and repeat the analysis.  
Foreign sample 
Again, a probit model is estimated to obtain a score for the propensity to receive public 
R&D funding. In the subsample of foreign-owned firms, size, past project applications and 
the export ratio positively influence the likelihood to receive a subsidy (see Table 5). Table 6 
presents the differences in the outcome variables after the matching. Also for the subsample 
of foreign-owned firms, the hypothesis of full crowding-out can be rejected. 
Table 5: Propensity to receive funding – foreign sample 
  Probit estimates    Marginal effects 
  Coef.  Std. Err.    dy/dx  Std. Err. 
lnEMP  0.1706 **  0.0715   0.0497 **  0.0207 
PROJ  0.8180 ***  0.1527   0.2382 ***  0.0519 
PAT/EMP  0.0107   0.0605   0.0031   0.0176 
EXQU 0.7054  **  0.2996   0.2054 **  0.0856 
CAPint  0.7180   1.1021   0.2091   0.3213 
CASHF/EMP  -0.4756   2.1239   -0.1385   0.6180 
SCOM  -0.0405   0.1858   -0.0118   0.0541 
YEAR°  -0.3911 **  0.1899   -0.1117 **  0.0522 
constant -2.1909  ***  0.5617         
BR  χ²(10) = 8.79  
 p = 0.5517 
Log-Likelihood -140.6634 
Pseudo R²  0.2984 
# obs.  361 
° dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). 
Standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
 
Table 6: Difference in R&D effort after the matching – foreign sample 
  Subsidized companies  Selected control group 
  Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err. 
---------------- α ° ----------------- 
RD 1.7345  0.3250  0.6316  0.1410  1.1029  ***  64% 
RDint 3.3398 0.6632  1.5548  0.4845 1.7850  * 53% 
lnRD -1.1122  0.3475 -2.9090 0.4103 1.7968  **   
lnRDint -0.3621  0.3011  -1.8293  0.3553  1.4672  **   
# obs.  75  75       
Note: Although BR_lnEMP were not jointly significant (χ² (10) = 5.51 p = 0.8548), they were included in the final 
propensity score for the sake of comparison with the other matching analyses. The control variables (lnEMP, PROJ, 
PAT/EMP, EXQU, CAPint, CASHF/EMP, SCOM, YEAR, BR and BR_lnEMP) as well as the propensity scores are 
not significantly different after the matching and therefore not reported here. 13 funded companies were deleted due to 
common support restrictions. 
° *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) of the t-tests on mean equality between the sample of funded 
firms and the selected control group. α is the average treatment effect of a subsidy on the funded firms. The relative 
difference is calculated as 




= = , 1
α
.These statistics are based on Lechner’s (2001) asymptotic approximation 
of the standard errors that accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. 
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Domestic sample 
In the last step, the additionality analysis focuses on the subsample of domestic firms. 
The probit model (see Domestic sample in Table 7) signals the impact of past project 
applications, patent stock, and export ratio. After the matching, the differences in outcome 
variables remain significant (see Domestic sample in Table 8): on average, a subsidy 
stimulates private R&D spending with 0.580 million EUR and the R&D intensity with 3.7%.  
Now I proceed and compare the additionality effects of foreign-owned and domestic 
firms by evaluating the differences in outcome variables between the funded and non-funded 
companies for each group. However, one could criticize this approach, as foreign-owned and 
domestic companies may well be very different. For example, foreign-owned firms are 
typically larger than domestic firms. This may be correlated with the R&D activity and bias 
the comparison of additionality effects between foreign-owned and domestic firms. Therefore, 
the analysis of domestic firms was refined by selecting a subsample of domestic firms which 
is similar to the sample of foreign-owned firms with respect to size, regional location and 
industry affiliation
17. The estimates for the propensity score (see “Domestic subsample” in 
Table 7) are slightly different, but the additionality effects remain strongly positive (see 
“Domestic subsample” in Table 8): on average, funded companies spend 1.237 million EUR 











                                                           
17 The subsample of domestic firms was selected in a hybrid matching model without replacement, selecting on similarities in the variables 
FUN, lnEMP, 11 industry dummies and 4 regional dummies. The number of observations reduces to 347.   25
Table 7: Propensity to receive funding – domestic sample 
   Probit model    Marginal effects    Probit model    Marginal effects 
   Coef.  dy/dx   Coef.   dy/dx 
  Domestic sample    Domestic subsample 
-0.0077     -0.0018     -0,0074     -0,0022    lnEMP 
(0.0406)  (0.0093)  (0.0871)   (0.0265) 
0.5748 ***    0.1317 ***    0.5095 ***    0.1549 ***  PROJ  (0.0687)  (0.0166)  (0.1365)   (0.0434) 
0.1111 ***    0.0255 ***    0.1767 **    0.0537 **  PAT/EMP  (0.0274)  (0.0064)  (0.0828)   (0.0259) 
0.4937 ***    0.1131 ***    0.9017 ***    0.2742 **  EXQU  (0.1415)  (0.0322)  (0.2630)   (0.0791) 
-0.0165     -0.0038      2.2620     0.6879    CAPint  (0.3869)  (0.0887)  (2.2130)   (0.6731) 
0.8376     0.192     0.0972     0.02956    CASHF/EMP  (0.7379)  (0.1696)  (5.9211)   (1.8007) 
0.181 *    0.0415 *    0.1800      0.0547    SCOM  (0.1008)  (0.0231)  (0.1733)   (0.0525) 
-0.148     -0.034     0.3207  *    0.0959  *  GROUP*  (0.1006)  (0.0231)  (0.1858)   (0.0543) 
-0.1425     -0.0327     -0.1368     -0.0413    YEAR*  (0.0911)  (0.0209)  (0.1799)   (0.0538) 
-1.2122 ***          -1.5188 ***        constant 
   (0.2196)          (0.4752)       
BR  χ² (11) = 15.64  
p = 0.1551 
χ² (11) = 8.68  
p = 0.6518 
Log-Likelihood -522.24896  -158.5842 
Pseudo R²  0.1422  0.2057 
# obs.  1353  347 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). 
Standard errors (between brackets) are obtained by the delta method. 
Table 8: Difference in R&D effort after the matching – domestic sample 
  Subsidized companies  Selected control group 
  Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err. 
------------- α ° ------------- 
Domestic sample 
RD 0.9007  0.2067  0.3204  0.0734  0.5803  **  64% 
RDint 5.6354  0.6765  1.9062  0.2898  3.7292  ***  66% 
lnRD -2.8590  0.2239  -5.4189  0.2749  2.5599  ***   
lnRDint -0.5586  0.2298  -3.3214  0.2723  2.7628  ***   
# obs.  218  218       
Domestic subsample 
RD 1.5326  0.4591  0.2952  0.0532  1.2374  ***  81% 
RDint 4.2369  0.9879  1.3863  0.2449  2.8506  ***  67% 
lnRD -2.1221  0.3444  -4.5588  0.4396  2.4367  ***   
lnRDint -0.5748  0.3214  -2.8101  0.4103  2.2353  ***   
# obs.  85  85       
Note: BR_lnEMP (χ²(11) = 21.65 - p = 0.0272 for the full domestic sample and χ²(11) = 4.76 - p = 
0.9420 for the domestic subsample) were included as well in the final propensity score. The control 
variables (lnEMP, PROJ, PAT/EMP, EXQU, CAPint, CASHF/EMP, GROUP, SCOM, YEAR, BR and 
BR_lnEMP) as well as the propensity scores are not significantly different after the matching and 
therefore not reported here. 7 and 6 funded companies were deleted due to common support restrictions 
from the full and subsample, respectively. 
° *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) of the t-tests on mean equality between the 
sample of funded firms and the selected control group. α is the average treatment effect of a subsidy on 
the funded firms. The relative difference is calculated as 




= = , 1
α
.These statistics are based 
on Lechner’s (2001) asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that accounts for sampling with 
replacement in the selected control group. 
 
The crowding-out hypothesis is rejected for both foreign-owned and domestic firms. 
However, there seem to be differences in the size of the treatment effect. In general, the R&D 
intensity of subsidized firms is 2.7% higher than the R&D intensity of non-subsidized firms.   26
However, the additionality effect on R&D intensity for foreign-owned firms is only 1.8%, 
while the effect for domestic firms is 3.7%. Even if I correct for the potential selection bias 
and only consider a selected sample of domestic companies
18, the impact of a subsidy on the 
R&D intensity is still larger (2.9%). Econometric tests however did not provide robust proof 
to support the significance of the difference in input additionality for foreign-owned and 
domestic firms. Nevertheless, as only a very limited number of foreign-owned companies 
receives a large part of the total subsidy amount available in Flanders, it is remarkable that 
there is no evidence indicating that the impact of subsidies is larger for foreign-owned 
companies. 
Next, I concentrate on the output side of the innovation system and evaluate the effect 
of R&D subsidies on innovative output as well as economic value. As outlined in the 
methodological section, the estimates from the input additionality analysis allow 
disentangling private and publicly induced R&D expenditure. Subsequently, I can also 
unravel their respective impact on our new set of outcome variables. RDC represents the 
counterfactual R&D expenditure, i.e. the investment a company would have made in the 
absence of the subsidy system. RDdif measures the R&D expenditure which was induced by 
the subsidy. Obviously, the value for RDC of non-funded firms just equals their R&D 
spending as they reported it and their RDdif value is zero. The new set of outcome variables is 
fourfold: TURNMAR (share of new-to-the-market products in the turnover * turnover in 
2005), TURNMAR/EMP (TURNMAR divided by the number of employees), PATdum (a 
dummy variable reflecting patent applications between 2004 and 2006) and NAV_growth (the 
growth of the net added value, between t+1 and t). For TURNMAR and TURNMAR/EMP a 
censored regression (cnreg) was conducted, as well as ordinary regression (reg) (as a 
robustness check). PATdum was included in a probit model, and NAV_growth was plugged 
in into an ordinary regression. Additional covariates in the models are size (EMP) and 
industry affiliation (BR). In the model estimating the impact on NAV_growth, the lagged 
value of the net added value per employee was included, to control for past productivity, as 
                                                           
18 Different shares of non-innovators in the potential control group may provide an additional explanation as to why the treatment effects are 
lower when only a selected subsample of domestic firms is taken into account. The share of innovators in the total sample (1441 
observations) amounts to 65%. The matching procedure enforces a high level of similarity between the funded (and per definition 
innovative) companies and non-funded (both innovative and potentially non-innovative) companies, including variables reflecting the 
innovative and technological strength of companies. As a result, the selected control group contains a large share of innovative companies 
and in the matched samples, the share of non-innovators is rather limited: 13% in the full matched sample (297 pairs); 14% in the domestic 
matched sample (218 pairs), 9% in the domestic matched subsample (85 pairs) and 5% in the foreign matched sample (75 pairs). T-tests 
reveal that the share of innovators is indeed significantly larger (p-value = 0.0001), when comparing the full domestic (436 companies) with 
the foreign (150 companies) matched samples. When we only take the subsample of domestic firms into account, the share of non-innovators 
is only slightly significantly higher (p-value = 0.0951) in the domestic matched sample (170 companies) compared to the foreign sample 
(150 companies). As a further robustness check, I conducted the analysis presented in this paper, but filtered out all non-innovators from the 
potential control group. The number of observations obviously drops significantly in the propensity score estimations, but apart from that, the 
results remain very similar. 
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well as the year of observation (YEAR=1 for CIS IV observations, as again pooled data from 
the CIS III and IV surveys is used). In a first series of regressions, a dummy variable 
indicating whether the company is a domestic firm (DOMESTIC=1) is introduced, in addition 
to RDC and RDdif. The results are displayed in Table 9. Both RDC and RDdif have a 
significantly positive impact on the share of new products in the turnover and the patenting 
propensity: larger R&D efforts are efficiently translated into more R&D output. Notably, also 
the publicly induced private R&D spending delivers a significantly positive innovative output. 
Tests show that the coefficient of RDdif even is significantly larger than the coefficient of 
RDC in the probit model: the additionally leveraged R&D expenditure apparently is being 
used in a more efficient way, resulting in more innovative output. This is a positive result, as 
one could argue that publicly induced R&D investments are allocated to more risky projects 
and may therefore not result in more innovative output (Setter and Tishler, 2005 and Aerts et 
al., 2007). RDC positively influences the growth of the net added value, but the publicly 
induced R&D expenditure does not seem to foster company growth. Overall, the conclusion is 
very optimistic, as it confirms that R&D subsidies not only stimulate R&D input, but also 
positively influence R&D output. A positive impact on the economic value can not be 
supported empirically, though. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient of DOMESTIC is significant and negative in some 
specifications. This may reflect heterogeneous effects for domestic versus foreign-owned 
firms. That is why a second bundle of very similar, but more flexible models is estimated. I 
now allow the coefficient estimates of RDC and RDdif to be different, depending on the 
ownership status, i.e. RDC and RDdif are interacted with DOMESTIC and FOREIGN (= 1 - 
DOMESTIC), resulting in the variables RDCDOM, RDCFOR, RDdifDOM and RDdifFOR. 
The advantage of this set-up is that the coefficients are directly comparable for the domestic 
and foreign-owned firms. The results (see Table 10) now demonstrate a more detailed picture 
and provide insight into the heterogeneous output effects of R&D subsidies. As expected, the 
counterfactual R&D expenditure has a positive impact on the share of new-to-the-market 
products in the turnover, the patenting probability and the growth of the net added value. This 
is in line with the previous results. I also find proof to state that R&D subsidies and the 
subsequently induced R&D expenditure raise the share of new-to-the-market products in the 
turnover and the patenting propensity. An astonishing result however, is that the censored 
regression model for TURNMAR and the probit model for PATdum provide evidence to 
conclude that the additionality effect is larger for foreign-owned firms. If we focus our   28
attention to NAV_growth, it can be noticed that there is no significant effect stemming from 
the additional R&D expenditure of domestic firms, but in contrast a significantly positive 
impact on foreign-owned firms.  
The current models investigate potential heterogeneity in domestic and foreign-owned 
firms. However, to some extent, this heterogeneity may be alleviated by the fact that the 
group of domestic firms includes independent companies as well as companies belonging to a 
Belgian group. Therefore, as a robustness check, an interaction term (DOMESTIC*GROUP) 
was included in the model presented in Table 10. The new variable only had a slightly 
significant positive impact in the probit model estimating the propensity to patent, but did not 
introduce any change in the remaining results.  
Table 9: Additionality effects at the R&D output side I 
Variable  TURNMAR  
(in mio €) 
TURNMAR/EMP  




(in mio €) 
   cnreg  reg  cnreg  reg  probit  reg 
NAV/EMP t-1                   -20.3390  ** 
                   (9.0592) 
DOMESTIC°  -0.3106 **  -0.1811   -1.6484 *  -0.8423   -0.3773 *  -0.0849  
 (0.1322)  (0.1447)  (0.8648)  (0.6215)  (0.1958)  (0.3277) 
RDC  0.3278 ***  0.3170 ***  0.7411 ***  0.683 ***  0.2023 *  0.4753 *** 
 (0.0322)  (0.0473)  (0.2231)  (0.1669)  (0.1038)  (0.1680) 
RDdif  0.3580 ***  0.3411 ***  1.0207 ***  0.8986 **  0.7322 **  0.2479  
 (0.0324)  (0.0724)  (0.2271)  (0.4244)  (0.3199)  (0.2693) 
EMP          -0.0053 ***  -0.0045 ***  0.0012 **  -0.0012  
         (0.0019)  (0.0012)  (0.0004)  (0.0010) 
YEAR                   0.2735  
                   (0.2102) 
constant  0.4708 ***  0.5010   2.7486 **  2.8777 ***  -1.571 ***  1.1955  
 (0.1764)  (0.3262)  (1.2596)  (0.7961)  (0.3733)  (0.8139) 
F(11. 137) = 1.73  F(11. 136) = 1.43  F(11. 136) = 0.74  F(11. 135) = 1.46  χ²(11) = 18.84  F(11.1437) = 2.88 
BR 
p = 0.0735  p = 0.1676  p = 0.6942  p = 0.1548  p = 0.0640  p = 0.0010 
Test  RDC - RDdif = 0 
F(1.137) = 0.48  F(1.136) = 0.09  F(1.136) = 0.95  F(1.135)= 0.29  χ²(1) = 2.76  F(11.1437)= 0.98 
 
p = 0.4918  p = 0.7672  p = 0.3313  p = 0.5942  p = 0.0964  p = 0.3329 
# obs.  151  151  151  151  360  1455 
(Pseudo) R²  0.3453  0.7033  0.0473  0.2405  0.2435  0.1194 
Standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. 
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Table 10: Additionality effects at the R&D output side II 
Variable  TURNMAR  
(in mio €) 
TURNMAR/EMP  




(in mio €) 
   cnreg  reg  cnreg  reg  probit  reg 
NAV/EMP t-1                  -19.7953  ** 
                   (8.8982) 
DOMESTIC°  -0.2700 *  -0.1623 **  -0.7252   -0.0977   -0.2078   0.0714  
  (0.1450) (0.0804) (0.9456) (0.6222) (0.2287)  (0.2945) 
RDCDOM  0.3421 ***  0.3368 ***  0.5719 **  0.5431 ***  0.4369 *  0.4564 *** 
  (0.0348) (0.0490) (0.2453) (0.0921) (0.2422)  (0.1647) 
RDCFOR  0.2959 ***  0.2620 ***  1.6535 ***  1.4371 *  0.2705 *  0.6086 * 
  (0.0747) (0.0387) (0.4910) (0.2130) (0.1443)  (0.3245) 
RDdifDOM  0.3279 ***  0.3109 ***  0.9445 ***  0.8305 ***  0.3551 *  -0.0393  
 (0.0345)    (0.0550)  (0.2340)  (0.4381)  (0.1992)  (0.1533) 
RDdifFOR  0.5110 ***  0.4999 *  1.4757 ***  1.3004 **  4.5903 ***  0.8596 * 
  (0.0785) (0.2572) (0.5618) (0.5381) (1.4261)  (0.5043) 
EMP          -0.0055 ***  -0.0047 ***  0.0012 ***  -0.0014  
         (0.0019)  (0.001)  (0.0005)  (0.0010) 
YEAR                   0.2973   
                   (0.2049) 
constant  0.3939 **  0.4348 **  2.0598   2.2806 **  -1.9307 ***  0.9995  
  (0.1827) (0.1917) (1.2779) (0.7040) (0.4687)  (0.7459) 
F(11.135) = 1.51  F(11.134) = 1.45  F(11.134) = 0.84  F(11.133) = 1.54  χ²(11) = 20.54  F(11. 1435) = 2.91 
BR 
p = 0.1347  p = 0.1593  p = 0.5968  p = 0.1252  p = 0.0384  p = 0.0008 
Tests  RDCdom - RDdifdom = 0 
F(1.135)= 0.09  F(1.134)= 0.12  F(1.134)= 1.37  F(1.133)= 0.44  χ²(1) = 0.08  F(1.1435) = 8.32    p = 0.7678  p = 0.7289  p = 0.2439  p = 0.5076  p = 0.7809  p = 0.0040 
  RDCfor – Rddiffor = 0 
F(1.135)= 4.30  F(1.134)= 1.00  F(1.134)= 0.06  F(1.133)= 0.06  χ²(1) = 9.56  F(1.1435) = 0.33    p = 0.0399  p = 0.3200  p = 0.7995  p = 0.8036  p = 0.0020  p = 0.5639 
  RDCdom – RDCfor = 0 
F(1.135)= 0.32  F(1.134)= 1.59  F(1.134)= 4.03  F(1.133)= 14.50  χ²(1) = 0.33  F(1.1435) = 0.20    p = 0.5755  p = 0.2102  p = 0.0466  p = 0.0002  p = 0.5631  p = 0.6517 
  RDdifdom – Rddiffor = 0 
F(1.135)= 4.55  F(1.134)= 0.53  F(1.134)= 0.82  F(1.133)= 0.52  χ²(1) = 8.60  F(1.1435) = 2.95 
 
p = 0.0347  p = 0.4699  p = 0.3664  p = 0.4723  p = 0.0034  p = 0.0860 
# obs.  151  151  151  151  360  1455 
(Pseudo) R²  0.3570  0.7192  0.0538  0.2665  0.3012  0.1342 
Standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. 
*** (**, *): significant at 1% (5%, 10%). 
6. Conclusion 
The large presence of foreign-owned companies in Flanders, especially in R&D 
intensive industries, combined with a limited number of foreign affiliates receiving the lion’s 
share of Flemish R&D subsidies, raises questions about the impact of foreign ownership on 
the effectiveness of public R&D funding. In a first step, the additionality effect on R&D 
expenditure was investigated in detail, employing a semi-parametric matching approach. It 
was found that R&D subsidies are effective, in the sense that they induce R&D investments, 
both in domestic and foreign firms. However, the difference in additionally invested R&D 
budgets is not significantly different between the two samples. This is remarkable, given that 
foreign affiliates typically receive larger grants. In a next step, I elaborated on the results from 
the matching procedure and disentangled the counterfactual, privately financed from the 
publicly induced, additional R&D expenditure. These R&D investment components were 
subsequently used as input factors for various productivity functions, in order to investigate   30
potential differences in efficiency. The results show that in general, both R&D expenditure 
components are translated into more R&D output: they both have a significantly positive 
impact on the share of new products in the turnover, as well as on the patenting activity. Only 
the counterfactual R&D expenditure adds to the economic value, though. Lastly, I analyzed 
whether efficiency differences exist in foreign-owned versus domestic firms. The tests show 
that both groups experience positive additionality effects, but also that foreign-owned firms 
seem to use publicly induced R&D expenditures in a more efficient way: compared to the 
domestic firms, the share of new products in the sales, as well as the patenting activity, 
realized by the publicly induced R&D expenditure is higher. Moreover, separating the 
foreign-owned firms shows that, in contrast to the domestic firms, they also capitalize growth 
of the net added value with the publicly induced R&D investments. Görg and Strobl (2007) 
do not find any support for additionality effects in their sample of Irish foreign-owned firms, 
but emphasize that this does not imply that the public R&D funding was wasted, as these 
firms now exhibit positive R&D investments, which may otherwise have been undertaken 
abroad. In contrast to the Irish situation, Flemish foreign-owned affiliates receive a substantial 
amount of public R&D money and this paper shows that the effects for Flanders are positive. 
My results are in line with the existing literature on superior innovative capabilities of 
foreign-owned firms. Although there are no significant differences in input additionality 
effects on domestic versus foreign-owned firms, the Flemish government’s policy of 
allocating large R&D grants to a limited number of foreign-owned firms, seems to be guided 
by their outperforming status in innovative activity. A major concern of the Flemish 
government is that the valorisation of the induced R&D efforts is realized within Flanders. 
The analysis in this paper shows that funded MNEs generate innovative output, which is also 
valorised in Flanders. This excellence in innovative efficiency may be driven by firm-specific 
assets encased in the MNE and easily accessible for its affiliates. The significantly positive 
impact of R&D subsidies on the net added value growth may emanate from better 
performance. However, a less optimistic and more down-to-earth, but not implausible 
explanation for foreign-owned firms’ higher output effects could additionally be found in 
purely economic arguments. R&D subsidies are the main instrument which gives some power 
to the Flemish government to attract or retain foreign multinational activity in Flanders, but 
the total amount which companies can receive is limited to 8 million EUR per year. In large 
MNEs, this is only a minor share of their total R&D expenditure and therefore, subsidies may 
be regarded as mere structural support. Hence, MNEs may bluntly conduct their accounting   31
evaluation exercises and consider R&D subsidies as a net inflow of money in their calculation 
of the net profit which can be realized in their subsidiaries. In this case, concluding that the 
growth of the net added value is a direct result of higher performance due to an R&D subsidy 
would rather be a deception.  
Two caveats are called for with respect to the measurement of public R&D funding in 
this paper. First, only information on a company’s funding status was used. This implies that 
the hypothesis is limited to assessing the presence of full crowding-out effects: the results 
show that funded firms spend more on R&D activities. However, it is possible that companies 
do not add the whole subsidized amount to their privately budgeted R&D expenditure, which 
would translate into partial crowding-out effects. To provide a decisive answer to this 
hypothesis, information on the grant size is needed, though. Second, the funding system is 
based on projects, while this research evaluates companies. It is not unlikely that a funded 
project is complementary to other projects and that positive spillovers between projects are 
generated. Therefore, additionality effects at the firm level may be induced by a funded 
project but originate from other projects within the company. It is not my aim to evaluate 
additionality effects at the project level, though, as the government’s aim is to increase 
companies’ R&D input and output, irrespective of how this increase is generated.  
I urge for further elaboration of the current study, and more specifically on three 
aspects, as this would significantly improve our insights into heterogeneous additionality 
effects of R&D subsidies due to the ownership structure. First, including additional 
information on the subsidy, i.e. the grant size, the granting authority, the specificities of the 
subsidy program, etc. will allow further refinement. Second, international R&D activity is 
worth a closer look: the degree of independence from the head quarters as well as intra-group 
knowledge flows and resource utilization may explain the better innovative performance of 
foreign affiliates, as they are likely to be correlated with the access to knowledge in the group 
as well as the extent to which affiliates can determine own topics to investigate in their R&D 
labs and the kind of R&D which is conducted (home-base-augmenting versus home-base-
exploiting). In this respect, also the validity of the economic argument should be tested. 
Finally, the public authority’s interest in the total impact of funding foreign-owned companies 
on the host economy and its innovative potential remains a valuable issue. Other indicators 
may be introduced. Moreover, taking a measure of embeddedness into account would allow 
scholars to also measure the more indirect impact on the host economy.    32
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Appendix 1: Summary statistics 
Variable  # obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max  # obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
FUN 1441  0.217  0.412  0  1                
FOREIGN 1441  0.258  0.438  0  1          
   NOT FUNDED 
   domestic foreign-owned 
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
RD (in mio EUR)  844  0.114  0.454  0  8.904  284  0.563  3.102  0  49.468 
RDint (in %)  844  1.296  4.510  0  56.602  284  1.141  3.391  0  31.818 
lnRD  844 -7.087  3.548  -9.509  2.187  284 -5.571  4.258  -9.509  3.901 
lnRDint  844 -4.836  3.725  -7.405  4.036  284 -3.924  3.760  -7.405  3.460 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
P(X)  844 0.169  0.133  0.019  0.977  284 0.165  0.129  0.007  0.965 
lnEMP  844 3.451  1.096  0  6.978  284 4.575  1.337  2.079  7.672 
PROJ  844 0.092  0.423  0  4  284 0.085  0.357  0  3 
PAT/EMP  844 0.083  0.768  0  16.552 284 0.146  1.151  0  17.107 
EXQU 844  0.286  0.314  0  1 284  0.499  0.390  0  1 
CAPint  844 0.037  0.134  0  3.638  284 0.042  0.083  0  0.780 
CASHF/EMP  844 0.014  0.024  -0.089  0.464  284 0.015  0.057  -0.233  0.821 
SCOM  844 0.774  0.437  0  3  284 0.903  0.520  0  3 
GROUP  844  0.339  0.474  0 1  284  1 0 0 1 
YEAR  844 0.528  0.499  0  1  284 0.482  0.501  0  1 
   FUNDED 
   domestic foreign-owned 
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
RD (in mio EUR)  225  1.006  3.418  0  25.152  88  3.384  8.051  0  63.552 
RDint (in %)  225  5.629  9.893  0  56.576  88  4.492  8.423  0  49.862 
lnRD  225  -2.821 3.327 -9.509 3.225  88 -0.666 3.008 -9.509 4.152 
lnRDint  225  -0.540 3.388 -7.405 4.036  88 -0.130 2.561 -7.405 3.909 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
P(X)  225  0.365 0.252 0.039  1  88 0.437 0.290 0.052  1 
lnEMP  225  3.912 1.341 0.693 7.763  88 5.429 1.376 1.946 7.847 
PROJ  225  0.733 1.892  0  24  88 1.886 4.853  0  32 
PAT/EMP  225  0.858 2.928  0  20  88 0.617 1.841  0  8.921 
EXQU 225  0.483  0.337  0  1 88  0.736  0.260 0  1 
CAPint  225  0.036 0.049 0.000 0.374  88 0.046 0.069 0.001 0.500 
CASHF/EMP  225  0.033 0.277 -0.310 4.141  88 0.018 0.020 -0.020 0.103 
SCOM    225  0.924 0.462  0  3  88 1.107 0.595  0  3 
GROUP  225  0.520  0.501  0 1  88  1 0 1 1 
YEAR  225  0.476 0.501  0  1  88 0.352 0.480  0  1 
Note: the details of BR and BR_lnEMP are not presented here.  
 
 
 
 
 